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Abstract
The aim of the present paper is to measure the labor market participation elasticity with respect to income tax
rates. A very complete data base of more than 500 000 observations a year is used. This data base is a large sample
of the French income tax returns. The case of spouses is studied by comparing - for very similar couples - the
probability of the secondary earner to participate in the labor market depending on the other foyer incomes on the
one hand and depending on the tax rate which would apply on the income of this potential work on the other hand.
Results ﬁnd labor market participation elasticity with respect to income tax rate equal to -0.04 and with respect
to income equal to -0.30. That for, it is outlined that joint income tax schedules have a negative impact on the
secondary earners participation to labor market. As secondary earners are mainly women in France, joint income
tax schedules have a negative impact on women participation to the labor market. Furthermore, diﬀerent elasticities
are measured for diﬀerent population categories. Two phenomenons appear, they conﬁrm each other partially. On
the one hand, there is a diﬀerence between secondary earners more or less constrained to participate in the labor
market. The more constrained ones have weaker elasticities than the less constrained ones. On the other hand,
there is a major diﬀerence between the capital holders and the others. The capital holders’ elasticity with respect to
income tax rate is higher than their elasticity with respect to income. The opposite occurred for the other households.
Key words: Labor supply; Time allocation; Fiscal incidence.
JEL classiﬁcation: H22; H31; J32.
11 Introduction
The aim of the present paper is to measure the labor supply elasticity of couple members with
respect to income tax rates. More speciﬁcally, the case of secondary earners is pointed out with the
hypothesis that they do not choose their working time but only their participation to labor market.
With empirical estimations upon a very large base of French income tax returns, secondary earner
participation elasticities with respect to tax rate and couple wealth are estimated and compared
for diﬀerent types of couples.
There exist two main reasons to limit the study to the case of secondary earners. One is linked
to the economic subject, the other to econometric needs. First, some characteristics of income tax
schedules may mainly inﬂuence secondary earner labor supply. Couple joint income taxation implies
a very high tax rate on the secondary earner’s potential wages, and therefore may be an incentive
to give up working. Second, labor market is imperfect. Some workers are very constrainted on
labor market, by ﬁnancial needs or social pressure. Furthermore, there is quite little choice to
really modify marginally one’s working time. These two imperfections have a smaller impact on
secondary earners because they have a real choice to participate or not because of the couple income
due to primary earners. This choice is not only a marginal choice but may be a complete choice to
participate to the labor market. Therefore, this choice is less constrained by working standards.
Estimating labor supply elasticities is a crucial point in determining optimal income tax sched-
ule, and it can be done from diﬀerent ways, ﬁnding diﬀerent estimates. Blundell & MaCurdy
(1999) deﬁne diﬀerent wage elasticities. The most appropriate elasticity to describe response to
one-and-for-all unanticipated shifts in net-of-tax wages is the intertemporal substitution elasticity
corrected from future wage rate variations. The simple intertemporal substitution elasticity over-
estimates this key parameter. The static substitution elasticity is inferior to the intertemporal one
without correction from future wage rate changes. Under some hypotheses - as the product of the
discount factor and the interest rate equal to 1 - the static substitution elasticity is equal to the
key parameter.
Feldstein (1995) uses panel data and the US 1986 tax reform to estimate an intertemporal
taxable income elasticity, that he found high: higher than 1. However, this study concerns only
the very high incomes, and does not control for the possible wage versus dividend shifts that some
very high incomes are able to realize. Gruber & Saez (2002) also estimate intertemporal elasticity
2of taxable income. They ﬁnd that labor supply elasticity with respect to tax rate is quite high
for the very high income agents. However, they ﬁnd that the income eﬀect is low. Piketty (1999)
ﬁnds lower elasticities for lower income agents, and explains these results by a substantial income
eﬀect. After a tax rate increase, the marginal rate diminishes the net-of-tax wage, and therefore the
incentive to work. However, not only the marginal wage is diminished, and the agent may have to
work more to compensate its wealth decrease. Saez (2003) tries to estimate the diﬀerence between
taxable income elasticity and wage income elasticity. He uses “bracket creep” variations and ﬁnds
signiﬁcant taxable income elasticities but insigniﬁcant and close to zero wage income elasticities.
This can be due to labor market rigidities: workers (except for the very high income) do not have
a real choice about their working time.
At that point, secondary earners may have a broader choice, and particularly the choice of
participating to full time job market or to half time job market. Blundell et al. (1998) ﬁnd
for example a very high income eﬀect for women with children, which should be for great part
secondary earners. For a theoretical point of view, Kleven et al. (2006) study the optimal taxation
of couples, using a speciﬁcation where secondary earners choose only to participate or not, and not
their working time. The model estimated in the present study is derivated from this one.
From an empirical point of view, Dagosvik et al. (1988), Bourguigon & Magnac (1990) and
Blundell & Laisney (1998) estimate working hours supply elasticity, and not participation elasticity.
From that hypothesis, Bourguigon & Magnac (1990) conclude that there is a lack of ﬂexibility in
working hours. Donni (2007), according to Donni (2003) theoretical results, keeps data about
non participating secondary earners to estimate the household labor supply elasticities. However,
the elasticities estimated deal with marginal working time variations. Piketty (1998) estimates
the impact on secondary earner participation of diﬀerent social gains, and speciﬁcally a parental
allocation. He ﬁnds that allocations to non working women with children are very strong incentive
for women with children to leave the labor market.
The present study focuses on the ﬁscal inﬂuence on secondary earner participation to the labor
market. The point is to estimate secondary earner participation probability elasticities with respect
to tax rate and income. The estimations use tax rate brackets as source of variation. The estimates
are made separately for diﬀerent social categories of couples, then compared. Thanks to the richness
of the data base, it is possible to estimate the elasticities for a high number of diﬀerent couple
3categories - actually, a division between 3 000 couple categories is done. This allows avoiding
some endogenous biases and provides information on diﬀerences between diﬀerent secondary earner
elasticities.
On a global point of view, substantial elasticities are found. Participation elasticity with respect
to the tax rate is found equal to -0.04, and participation elasticity with respect to other incomes
of the household is found equal to -0.30. This means that an increase from 10% to 11% (a 10%
increase) of the marginal tax rate for the secondary earner would induce that 1 working secondary
earner out of 250 will leave the labor market. An increase from 1000 to 1100 euros (a 10% increase)
of the monthly other income of the households would induce that 1 working secondary earner out of
33 will leave the labor market. That for, joint income tax schedules have a negative impact on the
secondary earner participation. As secondary earners are mainly women in France, joint income
tax schedules have a negative impact on women participation to the labor market.
Furthermore, elasticities of diﬀerent kinds of households are compared. Two main results are
found. First, households more constrained on labor market (low qualiﬁed, young, with children)
are less elastic than other households. Second, capital owner households have a higher elasticity
with respect to tax rate and a lower income eﬀect than other households.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework,
explaining the parameters that are estimated in the following sections. Section 3 introduces to the
French income tax schedule and presents the data used for the present study. Section 4 explains
the estimation methodology and presents the results. Section 5 discusses the results and oﬀers
concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical framework
Labor market is deeply imperfect. Two of the main imperfections on the supply side are some vital
or social constrains on the one hand, and the lack of marginal variation decision on the other hand.
Therefore, household labor supply models should take into account the existence of a primary and
a secondary earner. Kleven et al. (2006) present a model where the primary earner works and
chooses his working hours and the secondary earner chooses to participate or not at a ﬁxed working
time. The speciﬁcations used in the present paper are similar to those of Kleven et al. (2006), with
the decision of the secondary earner having no impact on the decision of the primary earner. The
4condition is then that the income tax schedule should be separable. However, if the income tax
schedule is not separable from itself, it can be considered as separable depending on the household
participation decision process. The primary earner works and the household considers this income
as the reference income. Then, the decision for the secondary earner to work is taken depending
on the returns of this potential working.
The model estimated in the present paper considers a household utility function U[C,L] de-
pending positively on the household consumption and the secondary earner leisure. The inﬂuence
of the secondary earner leisure on the household utility may either comes from the direct utility
of leisure for the secondary earner as from the utility of the unwaged work made by the secondary
earner during this “leisure” time. It may also correspond to consumption utility if the household
has to pay wages for domestic services in case of secondary earner participation.
The reference situation is the secondary earner non participation. The secondary earner leisure
is L0 and the household income by consumption unit is Y0(θ1,θ2), allowing the household to consume
C0(θ1,θ2). The parameter θ1 represents the observable characteristics of the household, which can
be the age of both members of the couple, their qualiﬁcation, their social class, their number of
children... This parameter deﬁnes a mean income whose the household may pretend to. Similar
households with respect to θ1 may receive diﬀerent exogenous shocks θ2 on their income. Therefore,
if the secondary earner does not participate, the couple utility depending on θ1 and θ2 is given by
equation 1.
Uθ1,θ3[C0(θ1,θ2),L0] (1)
Where θ3 reﬂects the individual preferences of the household. This parameter θ3 is supposed
to be unobservable and independent from θ2. Therefore, the optimization process results in the
probability for the θ1 and θ2 type secondary earner to participate and not in its actual choice to
participate.
The secondary earner may work for wages W(θ1), depending on the household characteristic
parameter θ1. This dependence comes from an endogamous hypothesis. Moreover, it is assumed
that the income shock θ2 has no impact on the potential secondary earner wages. Therefore, if the




,L0 − T] (2)
Where T is the working time, P is the price index and I[W(θ1),θ1,θ2] is the income tax paid by
the household on the secondary earner wages. This income tax depends on the secondary earner
wages W(θ1), but also on the other household income - actually θ1 and θ2 - because a joint income
tax is studied.
To present the result on a graph, another hypothesis is made: the utility function is assumed
to be separable. Two functions are then derivated from the utility function, depending on θ1,
θ2, θ3 and the working time t of the secondary earner. The ﬁrst function fθ1,θ3(t,θ2) gives the
utility increase due to consumption increase because of the secondary earner work. This function is
increasing and concave with respect to the secondary earner working time t for two reasons: ﬁrst,
the utility function is assumed to be concave with respect to the consumption and second, the
income tax schedule is assumed to be with increasing marginal rates. This function f is decreasing
with respect to the income shock θ2 for two reasons: ﬁrst, the utility function is concave with respect
to household consumption, which means that same net of tax secondary earner wages generate less
additional utility when the rest of household income Y0 is higher. It is the income eﬀect. Second,
the income tax schedule is joint and with increasing marginal rates. Therefore, when θ2 is higher,
the tax rate on secondary earner wages is higher, and the net of tax income from the secondary
earner work is lower. It is the marginal tax rate eﬀect.
The second function gθ1,θ3(t) gives the utility decrease due to leisure loss when the secondary
earner works a time t. This function is assumed to be increasing and convex with respect to t and
does not depend on θ2. Figure 1 shows functions f and g for θ1 and θ3 ﬁxed, and for two diﬀerent
values of the shock θ2: a value θ2 = h for a high income shock and a value θ2 = l for a low shock.
According to the lack of ﬂexibility in working hours, the only decision that can be taken by the
secondary earner is to work a time T ∗ or not to participate to the labor market. In Figure 1, the
secondary earner participates when the other income of the household has received a low shock θ2
and does not participate when it has received a high shock θ2.
According to θ3 exogenous distribution, the income shock θ2 should impact the probability for
the secondary earner of a θ1 household to participate to the labor market. The aim of the present
study is to estimate the impact on the secondary earner participation rate of the θ2 shock on the
6Figure 1: Secondary earner decision to work depending on other income shock
Note: This ﬁgure presents the participating choice, depending on the income shock θ2 (shock on the couple income
less the potential spouse wage). T∗ is the legal work time, the only work time possible for the secondary earner.
per consumption unit household income. First of all, the total eﬀect is estimated globally, then the
income eﬀect and the marginal tax rate eﬀect are estimated separately.
3 Data
The present paper uses French data to estimate the elasticity of the secondary earner participation
to labor market with respect to tax rate and household income. For doing so, a sample for 2005
of French income tax returns is used. This sample contains more than 500 000 observations repre-
senting the about 34 millions of French income tax returns. Therefore, the study uses more than
270 000 joint returns, as a sample of the 13 millions couples declaring jointly. The variables are
all the information provided by households in their income tax return, except for the names and
addresses.
In the French income tax return for married couple, the husband is declared as primary earner.
For couples living together with a PACS1, they can choose which one is declared as primary earner.
1PACS is a couple contract with some diﬀerence with marriage (may be contracted between homosexual partners),
that opens right to joint income tax declaration.
7However, primary earners are mainly men whereas women are mainly secondary earners for the het-
erosexual couples. This declaration of “declaring people” (primary earner) or “spouse” (secondary
earner) is meaningful. For the 2005 returns studied in the present papers, more than 77% of the
couples were with primary earner wages higher than secondary earner’s, and among the other 23%,
some couples include a retired primary earner. Similarly, there were only 250 000 declared sec-
ondary earner participating as the declared primary earner does not, among more than 13 millions
couples (less than 2%).
The French income tax schedule provides a good source of estimation for secondary earner
participation elasticity, because it is progressive and married people may declare jointly. Concerning
the progressive tax schedule, Figure 2 presents the French income tax schedule for a single without
any child.
Figure 2: French income tax schedule
Note: This ﬁgure presents the French income tax schedule. The mean rate and the global tax are calculated for a
single without children nor ﬁscal deduction.
Theoretical marginal rates appear to be high, but the real marginal rates are much lower. As an
example, 2005 French income tax collected less than 3% of the annual GDP, as the same percentage
is about 10% for most the other OECD countries. These high theoretical rates operate on a base
substantially lower than the real incomes2. However, if the facial values of these rates are not valid,
2For example, they operate on 72% of the wages lower than 120 000 euros, and on 50% of dividend income.
8brackets exist. Therefore, this schedule deﬁnes a convex function f that gives the tax amount T
from the income Y (T = f(Y )). The present paper uses the convexity of this function - and the
non continuity of its derivative - to estimate the spouse participation elasticity.
Furthermore, married and PACSed couples may declare jointly. To calculate the joint income
tax, a household should be attributed a number of parts p, according to Table 1.
Table 1: Number of parts for a declarant
Number of people in charge
Couple situation 0 1 2 3 suppl.
Couple (joint declaration) 2 parts 2,5 p. 3 p. 4 p. +1 p.
Couple (separeted declaration) 1 p. 1,5 p. 2 p. 3 p. +1 p.
Single 1 p. 2 p. 2,5 p. 3 p. +1 p.
Widow 1 p. 2,5 p. 3 p. 4 p. +1 p.
The number of parts due to couple is called the conjugal quotient, and the number of parts
due to people in charge3 is called family quotient. The household income tax is calculated as
T = pf(Y






≤ f(Y1)+f(Y2). The tax reduction due to conjugal quotient is unbounded whereas the
tax reduction due to family quotient is bounded.
For a given family quotient, the conjugal quotient provides an income tax diminish increasing
with respect to the diﬀerence between the earner’s incomes. Therefore, the tax diminish is mainly
decreasing with respect to the secondary earner wages, whose ﬁrst euro may be taxed at a quite
high marginal rate. This tax schedule may be a negative incentive for the secondary earner to
participate.
However, there exists a lot of other incentives to participate or not to participate to the labor
supply. Figure 3 presents four of the main determinants for secondary earner participation.
Concerning the number of children (e.g. Figure 3a), there appears no diﬀerence between the
participation of secondary earners with 1 and 2 children. After the third child, the participation
ratio decreases strongly. Angrist & Evans (1998) demonstrate that this diminish is not only due
to selection eﬀects. Using the situation of having two ﬁrst children of same sex as instrumental
3People in charge are mainly children, but they may also be old or dependant people.
9Figure 3: Determinants for second earner participation
a. Children b. Income level
c. Age d. Capital ownership
variable, they demonstrate that without other incidences, having three or more children constraints
the women participation to labor market. In addition, the low participation rate for couple without
any child in charge is due to three causes. First, there are some young couples whose secondary
earner is still a student. Second, there are some old couples, whose children are not in charge any
more, and who are retired. Third, other age couples without children may more easily stay out of
the labor market because they have less responsibility.
Concerning Figure 3b, the curve presents two parts. First, the secondary earner participation
rate is increasing with respect to the income tax bracket. An explaining way is endogamy. A low
couple tax bracket means that the primary earner wages are low, and therefore that its qualiﬁcation
may be low. In that case, the probability for the secondary earner to be also low qualiﬁed is
substantial. The second part of the curve is slowly decreasing. This may reﬂect the large scale
10impact of income eﬀect. Secondary earners married to a very rich primary earner have less necessity
than other to work.
Figure 3c presents the link between age and participation. The clearer eﬀect is retirement that
begins just before age of 60. After 60, it is quite the case for all secondary earners. There is a very
slow increase over the activity ages. Younger than 30 year-old secondary earners are a little less
participating than older ones. It can be caused by the existence of student secondary earners.
The last of these four ﬁgures, Figure 3d, presents the impact of asset owning on participation.
Asset owners participate less than other people. This is mainly caused by income eﬀect, that is
that they do not need to participate to earn income. Furthermore, it seems that the diﬀerence is
larger concerning real assets than ﬁnancial assets. The reason may be due to a composition eﬀect.
Old people are more likely to own real estate than ﬁnancial assets.
The point of the empirical study is to capture only the ﬁscal incidence on secondary earner
participation to labor market, and not the incidences presented in Figure 3. The empirical strategy
is then to compare couples identical with respect to these determinants of spouse labor supply.
According to the theoretical framework, the point is to compare only couples whose parameter θ1
is the same. Therefore, categories are built to compare only identical couples, and estimations are
done only within these categories. Table 2 presents the θ1 parameter calibration that divided the
sample between 3 000 household categories.
Table 2: Couple categorization
Parameters Nb. categories
Children 3 0, 1 or 2, ≥ 3
Child younger than 3 2 yes, no
Secondary earner age 5 ≤ 30,30-40,40-50,50-60, > 60
Primary earner age 5 ≤ 30,30-40,40-50,50-60, > 60
Primary earner wage 5 ≤ 0.5 SMIC, 0.5-1, 1-2, 2-4, > 4 SMIC
Financial asset returns 2 yes, no
Real asset returns 2 0, < 0.5 SMIC, > 0.5 SMIC
Note: SMIC is the French minimum wage, the value of a year full time job is used as income reference.
In addition, it is important to note that the French ﬁnance departement provides a free electronic
11service to estimate the income tax. Despite the huge complexity of the French income tax system,
it is easy and quick to estimate the income tax on line, with and without the secondary earner
potential wages.
4 Empirical results
In the fourth section, estimations are presented. There are two kinds of estimations aiming to
catch two diﬀerent eﬀects. In the ﬁrst subsection, the inﬂuence of the income shock θ2 is globally
estimated for diﬀerent couple categories (estimates consider together the income and marginal
tax rate eﬀects). The point is to understand which kind of spouse has high or low participation
elasticity. The second subsection tries to diﬀerentiate between the income eﬀect and the marginal
tax rate eﬀect. The point is to understand the main participation motivation for the diﬀerent
couple categories.
4.1 Global estimation
The ﬁrst subsection tries to understand globally the impact of primary earner income shocks θ2
on the probability π of the secondary earner participation to the labor market. The regression,
presented by equation (3), is a logit regression of the secondary earner participation rate on the
yearly income - excepted secondary earner wages - by consumption unit (this income is noted Ycu






= a + bln(Ycu) +
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θ1
cθ11θ1 + ui (3)
With the results of this regression, and particularly the parameters b and π, the secondary







= b(1 − π) (4)
First, this regression is implemented on the whole sample. Then, it is implemented on diﬀerent
subsamples. Each subsample represents a diﬀerent couple category. Table 3 presents the results
for child and age categorizations. Table 4 presents the results for income categorizations.
12Table 3: Spouse participation elasticity, child and age diﬀerention
Participation Income Overall
ratio parameter elasticity
π b b(1 − π)
Overall 47,9 % -0,246 -0,128*
(0,001) (0,001)
Children in charge
No child 31,2 % -0,360 -0,247*
(0,002) (0,001)
1 or 2 children 70,3 % -0,214 -0,064*
(0,001) (0,001)
More than 3 children 53,2 % -0,021 -0,018*
(0,003) (0,001)
Child younger than 3
No 45,6 % -0,286 -0,156*
(0,001) (0,001)
Yes 63,9 % 0,003 0,001
(0,003) (0,001)
Secondary eraner age
Less than 30 67,2 % 0,044 0,014*
(0,005) (0,002)
Between 30 and 40 69,6 % -0,101 -0,031*
(0,002) (0,001)
Between 40 and 50 69,7 % -0,242 -0,073*
(0,002) (0,001)
Between 50 and 60 55,1 % -0,347 -0,156*
(0,002) (0,001)
More than 60 5,4 % -0,017 -0,016*
(0,000) (0,000)
Primary earner age
Less than 30 72,9 % -0,033 -0,009*
(0,006) (0,002)
Between 30 and 40 70,7 % -0,093 -0,029*
(0,003) (0,001)
Between 40 and 50 69,6 % -0,257 -0,078*
(0,002) (0,001)
Between 50 and 60 60,0 % -0,334 -0,134*
(0,002) (0,001)
More than 60 11,9 % -0,247 -0,218*
(0,000) (0,000)
Notes: b is the coeﬃcient out of regression (3). Elasticities are calculated with respect to (4). *: signiﬁcant at 5%.
13Table 4: Spouse participation elasticity, income diﬀerention
Participation Income Overall
ratio parameter elasticity
π b b(1 − π)
Primary earner wages
< 6 871 23,4 % -0,124 -0,095*
(0,001) (0,001)
< 13 742 63,1 % -0,480 -0,177*
(0,006) (0,002)
< 27 485 75,0 % -0,925 -0,231*
(0,004) (0,001)
< 59 970 72,3 % -1,157 -0,320*
(0,005) (0,001)
> 59 970 53,6 % -0,409 -0,190*
(0,007) (0,003)
Household incomes
< 8 000 51,6 % 0,157 0,076*
(0,002) (0,001)
< 12 000 59,0 % -0,579 -0,237*
(0,015) (0,006)
< 20 000 47,3 % -1,359 -0,716*
(0,011) (0,006)
< 50 000 34,0 % -1,202 -0,793*
(0,008) (0,005)
< 100 000 33,0 % -0,227 -0,152*
(0,025) (0,017)
< 250 000 37,0 % 0,048 0,030
(0,037) (0,023)
< 1 000 000 39,7 % 0,071 0,042
(0,056) (0,034)
> 1 000 000 40,1 % -0,002 -0,001
(0,106) (0,063)
Movable capital
No income 50,7 % -0,158 -0,078*
(0,002) (0,001)
Income 42,7 % -0,372 -0,213*
(0,002) (0,001)
Real estate
No income 49,8 % -0,242 -0,121*
(0,001) (0,001)
Income 37,9 % -0,264 -0,164*
(0,003) (0,002)
Notes: b is the coeﬃcient out of regression (3). Elasticities are calculated with respect to (4). *: signiﬁcant at 5%.
14First of all, it appears that the secondary earner participation elasticity is high and that the
results are very signiﬁcant (almost all signiﬁcant at the level of 1%). The mean elasticity is found
equal to -0.13, which is substantially high. For an example, the mean participation ratio being
about 48%, if the income by consumption unit of 163 couples increases from 1500 to 1650 euros
monthly - that is a 10% increase - 1 spouse among the 78 that participate to the labor market stops
participating.
The point of the severall “by category” estimations is to compare secondary earner participation
elasticity between diﬀerent couple categories. Because the standard errors are quite all very small,
not only the eslasticity estimates are signiﬁcant, but the diﬀerences between these estimates are also
signiﬁcant. The main interpreting way is about constraints on the labour market. The idea is that
because of individual reasons, some secondary earners are forced to participate or not to participate.
Therefore, their participation does not depend (or suﬀer a weak dependence) on marginal variations
of their household income.
The ﬁrst constraint appearing is the existence of children in charge. Having children in charge
gives responsibility and may be an incentive for the secondary earner to participate. Therefore,
secondary earners without any child in charge have a high elasticity. This is not due only to
composition eﬀect, because young couples (mostly without children) and old couples (with children
not in charge anymore) have very low elasticities. Concerning, the third and more children category,
the results may be explained by the Angrist & Evans (1998) demonstration that third child presents
a real constraint on wives participation in the labor market. Indeed, secondary earners with three
children or more have an even less elasticity than those with one or two children. Furthermore,
having a young baby seems to have an even stronger eﬀect than having more than three children.
Spouses with less than three year old children have a higher participation rate and a lower elasticity
than spouses with more than three children.
Concerning the diﬀerentiation with respect to ages, two parameters are used: the secondary or
the primary earner ages. For the categories under 60 year old, the results are similar for the two
parameter diﬀerentiations. The secondary earner participation elasticity is increasing with respect
to the couple age. The constraint here is due to the fact that young people do not work only to
earn money, but also work to prepare the folllowing of their career. The decision to work is then
less strongly linked with the household budgetary constraint. However, there exists a diﬀerence
15between the two parameter categorizations concerning the more than 60 year old. The more than
60 year old secondary earners do not participate anymore, and have therefore very low participation
elasticity. Though, among the spouses of more than 60 year old primary earners, there is some
younger than 60 year old people. These secondary earners have very high participation elasticity
with respect to their household income - high enough to compensate the other secondary earner
low elasticity - because their retirement depends mainly on the income they would have during the
rest of their lives.
The elasticity is found ﬁrst increasing, then decreasing with respect to the primary earner wages
and the household income. The increasing part is intuitive, and may be explained by two arguments.
First, because of endogamy, spouses of primary earners with low wages have a higher probability to
suﬀer classical unemployement. They are therefore constrained in the labor market and have quite
no participation choice. Second, secondary earners whose household is less budgetary constrained
are freer to choose whether or not they will participate. The decreasing part is less intuitive. An
explaination is presented in the following subsection, by comparing income and tax rate eﬀects.
Concerning asset owning, it appears that asset owners have higher elasticity than others. How-
ever, there may be many reasons and the second subsection, with tax rate eﬀect and income eﬀect
diﬀerentiation, gives more information on that point too.
4.2 Tax incidence and income eﬀect
To identify the real causes of secondary participation, this subsection aims at determinating two
eﬀects in the participation elasticity: the marginal tax rate eﬀect and the income eﬀect. This is
possible because of two French income tax schedule properties. First, there exist tax deductions
that partly disconnect household income from household marginal tax rate. Second, there are dis-
continuities in marginal tax rates whereas household income is continuous. The point of the present
subsection is to estimate the income eﬀect through marginal diﬀerences in the household income
by consumption unit, and to estimate the tax rate through the income tax schedule discontinuities.
In order to keep the income eﬀect estimation, regression discontinuity analysis is not implemented.
However, the potential tax rate on the secondary earner is used to estimate the tax rate eﬀect, and
the potential tax rate diﬀerences between households are depending almost only on the disctance
to the tax schedule discontinuities.
16The estimations take two steps. The ﬁrst step is the secondary earner potential wages estimation
to calculate the potential tax rate on the secondary earnings. What impact the potential tax rate
is mainly the distance to the next bracket. Therefore, ﬁnal results depend weakly on the secondary
potential earnings estimation method4. The results presented here use the two steps Heckman
method correcting from selection bias. First, the participation is estimated with a probit model, the
Mills ratio ˆ M is calculated for each couple. This estimation is diﬀerent from the main participation
regression: it is done uniformly for the overall population, measuring the main participation causes
(the main participation regression controls from these causes to understand only the tax and income
impacts), as the children number, the age, the non-working income. In the present case, it is not
a problem that some regressors are used for the two steps of the Heckman estimation: because of
the huge number of observations, the Mills ratio is not colinear to the regressors. Then, regression
(5) estimates the secondary earner potential wages.
ln(WS) = a + bln(WP) + cln(YRA) + dln(YFA) + e ˆ M +
X
i,j
fi,j1[ages=i,j] + u (5)
Where WS are the secondary earner wages, WP the primary earner wages, YRA the household
real asset returns and YFA the household ﬁnancial asset returns. This regression gives the potential
wages W
p
S for each secondary earner. Two income taxes for each household are then calculated,
taking into account all the income tax deductions, reductions... The ﬁrst one is the income tax
I0 that would pay the household if the secondary earner does not participate to the labor market.
The second is the income tax I1 that would pay the household if the secondary earner participates
and earns W
p





What matters mostly is not actually the diﬀerence between potential wages, but the distance
of the household to the next income tax bracket. This explains why the income and marginal tax
rate elasticity estimates are similar using these potential wage estimates, potential wages estimated
with OLS or arbitrary the same potential wages for every secondary earner.
Then, the second step consists in a logit regression of the participation rate with respect to both
the secondary earner potential wage tax rate τ and the household other income Ycu by consumption
unit, as presented by equation (6).
4Three estimations of tax rate and income eﬀects have been implemented, with diﬀerent potential secondary






= α + β ln(τ) + γ ln(Yuc) + δ ln(τ) ∗ ln(Yuc) +
X
θ1
θ11θ1 + ui (6)
From this regression, the tax rate elasticity and the income elasticity of secondary earner par-
















= (γ + ln(τ)δ)(1 − π) (8)
This estimation process is ﬁrst implemented on the whole sample. Then, it is implemented on
diﬀerent subsamples, representing diﬀerent couple categories. Table 5 presents the results for child
and age categorizations. Table 6 presents the results for income categorizations.
First of all, it can be noticed that the income eﬀect seems to be higher with the present spec-
iﬁcation. The previous estimation strategy considers only the before tax income, and therefore
underestimates the income eﬀect. However, the previous interpretations does not take into account
the elasticity values themselves, but the elasticity diﬀerences between diﬀerent couple categories.
The previous subsection showed that the mean income eﬀect is high, it appears now that the
mean tax rate eﬀect is also substantial: -0.038. For example, the mean participation ratio being
about 47.9%, if the marginal income tax rate increases from 10% to 11% - that is a 10% increase -
for 550 couples, 1 secondary earner among the 263 that participate in the labor market stops her
participation.
Despite the importance of the participation elasticity with respect to the marginal tax rate, its
value is almost allways lower than the participation elasticity with respect to income. Furthermore,
concerning children and age categorizations, these two elasticities evolve in the same way as the
general elasticity studied in the previous subsection. The only diﬀerence appears for the more
than 60 year old categories. For the more than 60 year old secondary earners, the income eﬀect
decreases, whereas the tax rate eﬀect stays at a medium level. For the spouses of more than 60
year old primary earners, the tax rate eﬀect disappears whereas the income eﬀect takes oﬀ. This
conﬁrms the hypothesis of high elasticity because of retirement reasons. The main incentive for a
less than 60 year old secondary earner to follow his more than 60 year old spouse in retirement is
the income that the household would earn if the secondary earner retires.
18Table 5: Spouse participation elasticities, child and age diﬀerention
Participation Tax rate Income Crossed Tax rate Income
ratio parameter parameter parameter elasticity elasticity
π β γ δ [β + ln(Yuc)δ](1 − π) [γ + ln(Yuc)δ](1 − π)
Overall 47,9 % 1,405 -0,925 -0,152 -0,038* -0,296*
(0,012) (0,003) (0,001) (0,008) (0,002)
Children in charge
No child 31,2 % 1,073 -0,992 -0,112 -0,002 -0,503*
(0,018) (0,005) (0,002) (0,018) (0,005)
1 or 2 children 70,3 % 1,759 -0,852 -0,206 -0,047* -0,095*
(0,017) (0,005) (0,002) (0,007) (0,002)
More than 3 children 53,2 % 1,814 -0,715 -0,190 0,045 -0,059*
(0,036) (0,009) (0,004) (0,024) (0,007)
Children younger than 3
No 45,6 % 1,373 -0,947 -0,150 -0,026* -0,316*
(0,013) (0,004) (0,001) (0,008) (0,003)
Yes 63,9 % 1,250 -0,572 -0,130 0,022 -0,069*
(0,033) (0,010) (0,004) (0,018) (0,006)
Secondary earner age
Less than 30 67,2 % 0,336 -0,302 -0,035 0,007 -0,064*
(0,053) (0,019) (0,006) (0,025) (0,009)
Between 30 and 40 69,6 % 1,915 -0,860 -0,214 -0,017 -0,078*
(0,027) (0,008) (0,003) (0,012) (0,004)
Between 40 and 50 69,7 % 1,688 -0,893 -0,193 -0,033* -0,123*
(0,021) (0,006) (0,002) (0,008) (0,002)
Between 50 and 60 55,1 % 1,530 -1,046 -0,164 -0,017 -0,302*
(0,020) (0,006) (0,002) (0,012) (0,003)
More than 60 5,4 % -0,008 -0,010 0,001 0,002 -0,012*
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Primary earner age
Less than 30 72,9 % 0,006 -0,461 -0,006 -0,013 -0,120*
(0,089) (0,031) (0,010) (0,034) (0,012)
Between 30 and 40 70,7 % 1,967 -0,927 -0,215 -0,003 -0,092*
(0,029) (0,009) (0,003) (0,012) (0,004)
Between 40 and 50 69,6 % 1,565 -0,863 -0,178 -0,027* -0,120*
(0,023) (0,007) (0,003) (0,011) (0,003)
Between 50 and 60 60,0 % 1,582 -1,023 -0,174 -0,031* -0,252*
(0,019) (0,006) (0,002) (0,011) (0,003)
More than 60 11,9 % -1,324 -0,407 0,174 0,308* -0,722*
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Notes: β, γ and δ are the coeﬃcients out of regression (6). Elasticities are calculated with respect to (7) and (8). *: signiﬁcant at 5%.
19Table 6: Spouse participation elasticities, income diﬀerention
Participation Tax rate Income Crossed Tax rate Income
ratio parameter parameter parameter elasticity elasticity
π β γ δ [β + ln(Yuc)δ](1 − π) [γ + ln(Yuc)δ](1 − π)
Primary earner wages
< 6 871 23,4 % 0,405 -0,442 -0,053 -0,070* -0,237*
(0,014) (0,005) (0,002) (0,018) (0,005)
< 13 742 63,1 % 3,289 -1,467 -0,377 -0,025 -0,092*
(0,049) (0,014) (0,006) (0,027) (0,009)
< 27 485 75,0 % 6,367 -2,690 -0,677 -0,016 -0,217*
(0,045) (0,012) (0,005) (0,016) (0,005)
< 59 970 72,3 % 0,112 -1,203 -0,009 -0,006 -0,328*
(0,098) (0,016) (0,010) (0,039) (0,007)
> 59 970 53,6 % 1,271 -0,428 -0,191 -0,368o -0,077*
(0,294) (0,033) (0,028) (0,196) (0,023)
Household income
< 8 000 51,6 % -1,165 0,652 0,146 0,029 0,052*
(0,038) (0,018) (0,004) (0,024) (0,011)
< 12 000 59,0 % 2,285 -1,354 -0,240 -0,031 -0,268*
(0,278) (0,089) (0,030) (0,161) (0,051)
< 20 000 47,3 % -9,600 0,710 1,017 0,102 -0,844*
(0,283) (0,067) (0,029) (0,210) (0,050)
< 50 000 34,0 % -5,317 -0,666 0,567 0,319 -1,088*
(0,285) (0,045) (0,028) (0,267) (0,044)
< 100 000 33,0 % 17,800 -2,008 -1,652 -0,334 -0,003
(1,513) (0,161) (0,137) (1,436) (0,155)
< 250 000 37,0 % 2,961 -0,319 -0,308 -0,432 0,014
(2,511) (0,235) (0,211) (2,231) (0,209)
< 1 000 000 39,7 % -2,434 0,211 0,140 -0,381 0,031
(2,650) (0,238) (0,204) (2,250) (0,200)
> 1 000 000 40,1 % -4,114 0,274 0,291 -0,057 -0,044
(5,537) (0,439) (0,378) (4,661) (0,377)
Movable capital
No income 50,7 % 2,253 -1,341 -0,237 0,029* -0,349*
(0,016) (0,006) (0,002) (0,012) (0,004)
Income 42,7 % 0,475 -0,568 -0,065 -0,091* -0,226*
(0,023) (0,005) (0,003) (0,021) (0,005)
Real estate
No income 49,8 % 2,005 -1,218 -0,214 0,003 -0,333*
(0,014) (0,004) (0,002) (0,012) (0,003)
Income 37,9 % 0,633 -0,442 -0,084 -0,123* -0,167*
(0,034) (0,007) (0,004) (0,032) (0,007)
Notes: β, γ and δ are the coeﬃcients out of regression (6). Elasticities are calculated with respect to (7) and (8). *: signiﬁcant at 5%.
20Concerning the wage and income categorizations, it appears in the previous subsection that
elasticity is ﬁrst increasing then decreasing. For the increasing part, the reason of this variation is
mainly the income eﬀect, which reaches -1 for the couples earning yearly between 12 000 and 50
000 euros by consumption unit. Following, the income eﬀect decreases for richer households. It
seems that the tax rate eﬀect increases when the global elasticity decreases, but this result is not
signiﬁcant.
The elasticity crossing is signiﬁcant for the asset owning categorizations. The asset owners have
higher tax rate elasticity and lower income elasticity than asset non owners. This crossing occurs
both for ﬁnancial asset owning and real asset owning. There are two ways of understanding this
phenomenon. The ﬁrst interpretation is that budget constraint of the richer households is not
tightening at all. Therefore, income eﬀect is weak. At the opposite, they make the participation
depends on what the secondary earner may earn, and the elasticity with respect to income tax rate
is high.
The other way of understanding the elasticity crossing is to have an intertemporal interpreta-
tion. This is not an interpretation opposed to the previous one, but a complementary interpretation.
Wealthier households and asset owners have a longer run intertemporal optimization of their de-
cisions (or wealth and capital allow their owners to optimize intertemporally their decisions). For
these households, an income shock is smoothed all along the life cycle and has therefore little impact
on their labor market participation decisions.
5 Conclusions
The present study points out the impact of household income and income tax rates on the secondary
earner participation in the labor market. That for, it outlines that joint income tax schedules may
have a negative impact on the secondary earners participation. As secondary earners are mainly
women in France, joint income tax schedules have a negative impact on women participation in the
labor market.
This negative impact occurs through two diﬀerent ways. First, joint income tax schedules
provide income tax reduction to households. Therefore, they are wealthier, which is an incentive
not to participate for the secondary earner. This income eﬀect is particularly eﬀective for middle
class households. Second, joint income tax schedules make the tax rate higher for secondary earner
21wages. This is also an incentive not to participate for the secondary earner. This tax rate eﬀect
is particularly eﬀective for higher class households. Lower class households are little impacted by
these two eﬀects, because they are more constrained on the labor market from a demand point of
view.
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